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Developed by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997, 2001), the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
requires individuals to determine mental states from photos of pairs of eyes. Used in
over 250 studies, it has been conceptualized as an advanced theory of mind test that is
relatively free of general cognitive abilities. Given the sensitivity of the instrument, many
studies with healthy adult samples have used this instrument as a measure of individual
differences in social-perceptual processes that contribute to theory of mind and overall
phenotype. We administered the two-subtest Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence,
a face-processing task (Cambridge Face Memory Test), and the Eyes Test to 42 college
students. Surprisingly, verbal IQ contributed significantly to the variance in Eyes Test per-
formance while the face perception measure did not. These findings have both practical
and theoretical ramifications for interpreting Eyes Test results in normative adult samples.
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INTRODUCTION
The relative ease or difficulty an individual experiences in under-
standing others influences his or her outcome across a range of
settings (e.g., career choice, relationship success). Toward the goal
of understanding individual differences among high-functioning
adults in mental state understanding, a wide array of instruments
have been developed. By design, some measures (e.g., Strange Sto-
ries Task: Happe, 1994; and the Faux Pas task: Baron-Cohen et al.,
1999) involve making explicit inferences about the contents of
another’s thoughts communicated linguistically (e.g., sentences of
dialog between characters). Other instruments examine implicit
social-perceptual processes like judging emotion or mental state
information from non-verbal channels (e.g., facial display, voice).
A number of researchers have argued that our full “mentalizing”
ability rests on the integration of such fast and automatic implicit
processes with more cognitively mediated explicit processes (Sab-
bagh, 2004; Frith and Frith, 2008; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009).
Among the many tests used to study individual differences among
high-functioning adults in mentalizing, the Reading the Mind in
the Eyes Test (henceforth, Eyes Test) has emerged as a standard
evidenced by its use in more than 250 studies, translation into
several languages, and adaptations for many different research
contexts (for reviews, see Johnston et al., 2008; Adams et al., 2009;
Hallerback et al., 2009). Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) describe the
task as involving “unconscious, rapid, and automatic” processes,
consistent with an implicit task, relatively free from general cog-
nitive ability. Despite its widespread use, the instrument has been
minimally explored and the degree to which performance relies
on implicit social-cognitive processes free from more general
cognitive ability remains unknown.
The Eyes Test involves examining pairs of eyes (cut out from the
face) and making a forced choice among descriptors to identify the
mental state or emotion. Although it was first introduced in autism
research (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), the Eyes Test’s potential for
studying individual differences among normally developing indi-
viduals was quickly established. First, in a later broad autism phe-
notype study, parents of children with autism spectrum disorders
performed more poorly than comparison participants (Baron-
Cohen and Hammer, 1997). In a series of subsequent studies
aimed at examining individual differences in mentalizing among
healthy adults, Baron-Cohen and colleagues demonstrated that
the Eyes Test, in conjunction with other measures, discriminates
between individuals with a propensity for humanities from indi-
viduals with a physical sciences orientation (Billington et al., 2007).
To date, many researchers have used this instrument to probe for
individual differences in theory of mind ability and personality
(e.g., Dziobek et al., 2005; Carroll and Yung, 2006; Mar et al., 2006;
Declerck and Bogaert, 2008; Ferguson and Austin, 2010; Lee et al.,
2010; Sylwester et al., 2012).
In the current study, we explored the Eyes Test in conjunc-
tion with several tasks. Our choice of tasks was motivated by two
general questions. Our primary question concerned the degree to
which the Eyes Test correlated with IQ relative to a more basic face-
processing task. Of course, given that the task involves choosing
verbal descriptors it must certainly involve verbal ability. However,
we presume that its strength as a social-cognitive index depends,
in part, on whether variance is driven by the social-perceptual
ability to glean mental state information from the eyes rather
than a domain-general cognitive ability. To address our first ques-
tion, we examined the relationship of two subtests of the Wechsler
Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (Vocabulary and Matrix Reason-
ing) and the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT, Duchaine and
Nakayama, 2006) to Eyes Test performance. The CFMT was chosen
as a basic measure of face processing because, like the Eyes Test, it
relies on a quick visual perception of the facial region. The CFMT
was designed to be sensitive to the full spectrum of individual
www.frontiersin.org July 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 220 | 1
Peterson and Miller Eyes test and verbal IQ
differences in face processing (i.e., from severely impaired to
exceptionally skilled) and its validity has been demonstrated across
a wide functional range (Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006).
Our secondary question reflects the contribution of the autism
literature to our understanding of typical social cognition. The
importance of the relevance of autism for understanding individ-
ual differences in typical social-cognitive development has received
strong support from recent genetically sensitive studies (Constan-
tino and Todd, 2003; Ronald et al., 2006). Collectively, these recent
studies demonstrate that subclinical autism traits are normally
distributed in the population. Thus, for example, one may pos-
sess a subset of the genetic risk factors for autism and express
some specific autism-like traits (e.g., difficulty reading face emo-
tion, difficulty with some aspects of language) without meeting
criteria for diagnosis. We included measures of two language
component skills that have been associated with genetic vulner-
ability to autism. Specifically, first-degree relatives of individuals
with autism have more difficulty with phonological processing
(Schmidt et al., 2008) and the pragmatics of language (Piven et al.,
1997; Losh and Piven, 2007) compared to family members of non-
autistic control participants. Thus, we selected two additional tasks
to measure phonological memory and the appreciation of figu-
rative language (i.e., understanding idiom and metaphor). The
figurative language measure was of particular interest given that
proficiency in the pragmatics of language requires an apprecia-
tion of the speaker’s intention and the social context. In other
disorders besides autism, a relationship between pragmatic lan-
guage ability and social understanding has been demonstrated
(e.g., schizophrenia: Gavilan and Garcia-Albea, 2011; bipolar dis-
order: McClure et al., 2005). In this more exploratory aspect of
our study, we reasoned that performance on one or both of these
measures may account for some of the variance captured by verbal
IQ. Alternatively, these additional measures may relate to Eyes Test
performance independently from verbal IQ.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We recruited 45 college students from a medium-sized university.
Participation involved two visits. Three participants did not return
for a second visit, yielding a sample of 42 (23 males; Mean age= 19,
Range= 17-34). Participants were excluded from the study if Eng-
lish was not their first language. All participants provided informed
consent and received course credit. Our study was approved by our
institution’s review board.
CONSTRUCTS AND INSTRUMENTATION
Understanding mental states based on examining the eye region
The revised version of the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)
consists of 36 black-and-white photographs of the eye region.
In each trial, participants are instructed to choose among four
descriptors based on what the person in the photograph was think-
ing or feeling. In an earlier psychometric analysis of the Eyes Test
including a test-retest reliability study, we identified 7 items that
reduced the overall alpha in each of the two administrations (Peter-
son et al., in preparation). For the current study, these 7 items were
eliminated so the test was administered with 29 items. Each item
was accompanied by the same four response options included in
the original Eyes Test. Participants were provided a glossary of def-
initions for all of the response choices. For the purpose of analysis,
individual scores on the Eyes Test consist of the total number of
correct responses.
Face recognition
The CFMT (Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006) is a computerized
test consisting of a total of 72 trials, divided into three separate,
progressively difficult stages in which participants are asked to rec-
ognize target faces among several distracter faces. The CFMT score
is computed by summing the total of number of correct responses
across all three stages.
Verbal and performance IQ
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) is a
norm-referenced measure of intelligence that has well-established
reliability and validity (Wechsler, 1999). We administered the
two-subtest WASI (Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning). In prior
research, these two subtests have exhibited high factor loadings on
a general intelligence factor (Kaufmann, 1994) and were therefore
considered an adequate measure of overall intelligence. For each
subtest raw scores were converted to age-corrected T -scores. Full-
scale IQ was derived by summing the T -scores of the two subtests
and converting the summed score to a standard score.
Phonological memory
The Non-word Repetition subtest of the Comprehensive Test of
Phonological Processing (CTOPP, Wagner et al., 1999) consists
of 18 items of pronounceable non-words. Participants listen to an
audio recording of pseudowords of increasing difficulty and repeat
the non-word aloud immediately after hearing it. The examiner
judged each item as correct or incorrect on line. Raw scores were
converted to age-correlated scaled scores.
Figurative language
The Figurative Language subtest of the Test of Language Compe-
tence (TLC, Wigg and Secord, 1989) was used to assess the ability
to understand meaning intended in sentences involving relatively
abstract language. On this 12-item task, participants are told about
a situation and provided with a figurative expression (e.g., “He is
high man on the totem pole”). They are first asked to describe the
meaning of the expression in their own words. Then they are read
and shown four response statements from which they choose the
most equivalent alternative expression (e.g., “He is top dog”). Raw
scores were converted to age-corrected scaled scores.
PROCEDURE
This study was part of a larger investigation of the Eyes Test. Data
were collected across two testing sessions. In the initial session, par-
ticipants completed the Eyes Test and CFMT. In the second session,
participants completed the two-subtest WASI, CTOPP Non-word
Repetition subtest, and TLC Figurative Language subtest.
DATA ANALYSIS
SPSS 18.0 statistical software was used to conduct all analyses.
Distributional properties of our variables were examined and
all were normally distributed. We examined the Pearson correla-
tions among variables and a multiple regression analysis identified
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predictors accounting for unique variance in Eyes Test perfor-
mance. An alpha value of 0.05 was used to establish the threshold
for significance.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides the means and standard deviations for each task
and Table 2 provides the Pearson correlations between the Eyes
Test and scores on the WASI, CFMT, and CTOPP. Importantly,
the mean IQ estimate for our sample of 42 college students (105)
was close to national norms. While the Matrix Reasoning sub-
test did not significantly correlate with Eyes Test performance, the
Vocabulary subtest did (r = 0.49, p= 0.001, a large effect size).
Performance in the CFMT, our face-processing measure, was not
associated with performance on either WASI subtest. There was no
association between performance on the CFMT and the Eyes Test.
Our secondary question concerned whether two linguistic skills
(phonological memory and appreciation of figurative language)
contribute independently from verbal IQ to Eyes Test perfor-
mance. The figurative language test but not the test of phonological
processing related to individual Eyes Test scores. A follow-up
regression analysis was conducted in which both of the verbal
measures that had been significant in the bivariate analyses (ver-
bal IQ, figurative language) were used to predict Eyes Test score.
Total R2 was 0.28 (p= 0.002). Verbal IQ explained significant
Table 1 | Descriptive data.
Instrument Means (SD)
Eyes test1 21.26 (2.85)
CFMT1 54.80 (7.98)
WASI vocabulary2 51.40 (7.82)
WASI matrix reasoning2 54.21 (6.29)
WASI full-scale IQ3 104.79 (9.92)
CTOPP non-word repetition4 9.19 (1.84)
TLC figurative subtest language4 8.69 (2.40)
SD, standard deviation; CFMT, Cambridge Face Memory Test; WASI, Wechsler
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; CTOPP, Comprehensive Test of Phonological
Processing; TLC, Test of Language Competence.
1Raw score.
2T score with a population mean= 50, SD=10.
3Standard score with a population mean=100, SD=15.
4Scaled score with a population mean=10, SD=3.
unique variance in Eyes Test performance (β= 0.36, p= 0.028),
but figurative language did not (β= 0.24, p> 0.1).
DISCUSSION
The central finding of our study was that performance on the
Eyes Test correlated to a surprising degree with verbal IQ and
not with a more basic measure of face processing. We believe this
finding has practical importance for considering the value of the
Eyes Test as an instrument for studying individual differences in
social cognition among adults. Further, we believe our results raise
a question about the degree to which performance differences in
this instrument reflect a relatively implicit mechanism.
Across the past decade or so, research emerging from a range of
sub-disciplines has highlighted the importance of understanding
the mechanisms supporting individual differences among adults
in the ability to understand other’s mental states. A central premise
of this effort is that our full mentalizing ability rests on a range of
both explicit and implicit processes. Apperly and Butterfill (2009)
have posited a dual route framework with one route character-
ized by speed and efficiency at the cost of flexibility, and another
route that is slower, more cognitively demanding, and supported
by domain-general cognitive processes like executive control. In
the case of the Eyes Test, it is reasonable to speculate that implicit
processes may be particularly important for task performance.
One must examine a pair of eyes and make a relatively automatic
judgment to choose the best mental state descriptor (the eyes look
“skeptical” rather than “indifferent,” “embarrassed,” or “dispir-
ited”). However, in no trial does performance require an explicit
meta-representation, that is, a representation of another’s thought
process (e.g., what exactly the person is skeptical about). Of course,
it is important to differentiate between the minimal demands nec-
essary for success as opposed to the important and ambiguous
question as to what the participant thinks when examining the
pair of eyes.
Presumably, individual differences on an implicit social-
perceptual task should be minimally influenced by participant
differences in verbal IQ. However, our results show that in a college
sample with a mean IQ close to national norms, verbal IQ alone
accounts for almost 25% of the variance in Eyes Test performance.
In the current study, verbal IQ was estimated using a measure of
expressive vocabulary that taps basic vocabulary knowledge as well
as other expressive language skills. Following the original Eyes Test
instructions, we provided a list of definitions for all the descriptors
and we encouraged participants to consult the list whenever they
Table 2 | Pearson correlations.
Eyes test WASI vocabulary WASI matrix reasoning CTOPP non-word repetition TLC FL CFMT
Eyes test
WASI vocabulary 0.49
WASI matrix reasoning 0.18 0.29
CTOPP non-word repetition −0.05 −0.15 0.03
TLC figurative language 0.43 0.53 0.26 −0.12
CFMT 0.01 0.01 0.21 −0.17 0.22
Bolded correlations are significant at the 0.05 alpha level (two-tailed).
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felt uncertain about the meaning of a word. Nevertheless, it may
be that the relation between verbal IQ and Eyes Test performance
is driven primarily by individual differences in vocabulary knowl-
edge. However, it seems more likely that other cognitive processes
contribute substantially to performance differences. Reasonable
candidates include verbal-reasoning and verbal working memory.
In order to obtain a more refined understanding of the cog-
nitive processes contributing to the overlap between the Eyes Test
and the Wechsler Vocabulary subtest, a future study should include
both traditionally explicit and implicit mental state reading tasks
as well as measures of vocabulary knowledge, verbal-reasoning,
and verbal working memory. By design, mentalizing tasks, like the
Strange Stories test and the Faux Pas test involve rich linguistic
processing in order to extract explicit mental state information
conveyed by sentences. The standard interpretation of the Eyes
Test would predict a relatively greater verbal IQ contribution to
these tests. However, our own results showing a surprisingly high
correlation between the Eyes Test and verbal IQ cast some doubt
on this prediction. In a recent meta-analytic investigation (Kirk-
land et al., 2012), we examined studies in which the Eyes Test and
either the Strange Stories and/or the Faux Pas test were adminis-
tered. Our results demonstrated a moderate correlation (r = 0.29)
between performance on the Eyes Test and each of these measures.
Inclusion of face emotion reading tasks like the Diagnostic Analy-
sis of Non-verbal Behavior (DANVA) tasks that minimally involve
language would provide an important opportunity to compare
the relative contribution of general intelligence processes in each
category of task.
Importantly, such a future study should include cognitive mea-
sures intended to explore more precisely the role of verbal ability.
First, to eliminate the unlikely possibility that vocabulary knowl-
edge alone contributes significantly, a vocabulary test could be
included that specifically targets word meanings from the Eyes
Test items. While the instrument includes a set of definitions and
participants are encouraged to make use of it, it is unclear to what
degree this intervention reduces the variance attributable to vocab-
ulary knowledge. Second, it would be important to include other
measures of verbal ability (e.g., Wechsler Similarities subtest) in
order to examine verbal-reasoning ability as well as a measure of
verbal working memory. It is well known that explicit tasks like the
Strange Stories test involve executive control, in particular, work-
ing memory. It is possible that both the Eyes Test and the Strange
Stories test (which our meta-analysis show to be moderately cor-
related) share an underlying component of general intelligence
that may be common to tasks involving mental state reasoning.
However, in our own single study, the correlation between the
Eyes Test and the Vocabulary subtest was notably higher than the
correlation with either the Strange Stories or the Faux Pas test
(0.49 versus 0.29). Indeed, given that the standard deviation of our
sample’s mean IQ score was smaller than that of the population, a
restricted range correction (Thorndike, 1947) suggests r = 0.64 is
a better estimate of the real effect. Of course, the effect size from
the meta-analysis is much more likely to be free of sampling error
than that of our single study.
In our study, more than 70% of the variance in Eyes Task per-
formance remained unaccounted for. A central goal of our study
was to ask whether some of the variance would be explained by
a basic measure of face processing which was presumed not to
overlap with verbal IQ. The CFMT was originally developed as a
standardized measure of face recognition. In an initial study of the
CFMT (Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006), the task yielded a wide
range of scores that did not cluster near the floor or ceiling, sug-
gesting that it was sensitive to the full spectrum of face recognition
ability from severely impaired to significantly better than average
(i.e., “super recognizers, ” Russell et al., 2009). Consistent with the
conception of this task as a very basic face-processing measure, it
did not show any correlation with verbal or performance IQ in the
current study.
Considering the lack of any relationship between the Eyes Test
and the CFMT in our sample, it is reasonable to question the lack
of an explicit social emotional judgment in the CFMT as compared
to the Eyes Test. However, given the profound social significance
of the human face, even a very basic face-processing task could be
expected to relate to broader social cognition. Indeed, one recent
study examined the degree to which individual performance in
face recognition for neutral faces correlated with performance in
either the Eyes Test or the DANVA facial expression scale, an instru-
ment that involves reading face emotion (Franklin and Adams,
2010). As predicted, participants who showed better memory for
neutral faces performed better on face emotion reading. How-
ever, as in the current study, Franklin and Adams obtained no
correlation between basic face recognition memory and Eyes Test
performance. The authors did obtain a correlation between the
Eyes Test and face emotion reading in spite of the lack of a rela-
tionship between the Eyes Test and the more basic face-processing
task. Presumably, performance on the Eyes Test and the DANVA
involved a common underlying ability that does not seem to
relate to face recognition. Our own results together with Franklin
and Adams (2010) suggest that to the degree that the variance
unaccounted for by verbal IQ reflects implicit social-perceptual
processes, these processes did not contribute to differences in a
more basic face-processing task.
The Eyes Test was originally developed for the study of high-
functioning individuals on the autism spectrum as well as their
family members (e.g., Baron-Cohen and Hammer, 1997; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997). Since these early studies, the instrument has
proved valuable for the examination of individual differences
among normally developing samples (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001). Given both the notion of a broader autism phenotype
(Baron-Cohen and Hammer, 1997) and the understanding that
autism symptomatology is normally distributed in the general
population (Constantino and Todd, 2003), we were motivated to
explore the degree to which any influence of verbal IQ might over-
lap with either phonological memory or figurative language, as
has been observed both in individuals with autism and in the
broader phenotype. We were particularly interested in the rela-
tionship between figurative language and Eyes Test performance,
given that this aspect of language processing is specifically related
to social cognition. Indeed, in the cases of both autism, schizophre-
nia, and bipolar disorder this particular language deficit have been
related to degree of social-cognitive impairment (McClure et al.,
2005; Losh and Piven, 2007; Gavilan and Garcia-Albea, 2011). In
our results, phonological memory did not correlate with Eyes Test
performance. We did obtain a correlation between the measure of
Frontiers in Psychology | Personality Science and Individual Differences July 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 220 | 4
Peterson and Miller Eyes test and verbal IQ
figurative language ability and Eyes Test performance. However,
the follow-up regression analysis determined that this effect is
not independent from verbal IQ. The results of our study are
consistent with the hypothesis that while these specific linguis-
tic measures may explain variance in a disordered population or
within a sample of individuals who possess a subset of the genetic
risk factors for an autism spectrum disorder, they do not help to
explain individual differences within a normal population.
Our study included a number of limitations that should be con-
sidered while interpreting our results. First, it must be emphasized
that we can only speculate about the precise processes involved
in the Eyes Test and the role of verbal IQ in contributing to per-
formance differences. While researchers agree that mentalizing in
natural contexts must involve many separate processes that range
from implicit perceptual to rich conceptual processing (e.g., Frith
and Frith, 2008), it is not clear which processes mediate perfor-
mance in this measure. Further, fundamental questions remain as
to the neurocognitive basis of theory of mind and the degree to
which explicit and implicit processes involve discreet or overlap-
ping mechanisms (e.g., Evans, 2008; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009).
Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) argued in favor of a relatively implicit
underlying process. Clearly, a test of individual differences in social
cognition would have more value to the degree that performance
reflects an implicit mentalizing process rather than a more general
cognitive ability involving verbal intelligence. Although our find-
ings cannot provide further insight into the specific role of verbal
IQ during task performance, they raise questions about the degree
to which the task is relatively free of general cognitive ability. It
should be noted that to the degree that individuals employ differ-
ent strategies on the task, the relative contributions of implicit and
explicit processes may vary across individuals. Unfortunately, we
cannot tease apart process differences within individuals.
In more than 250 studies across a wide range of research
contexts, the Eyes Test has provided an index of individual dif-
ferences in mental state understanding (Kirkland et al., under
review). While we recognize the productivity of this instrument,
we believe our findings highlight the value of further investigation
both to guide interpretation in studies involving this instrument
and toward the broader goal of understanding the neurocognitive
basis of mental state understanding.
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